Anthropology of volunteering. Biology

Since the Early Modern period, European non-secular thought has gradually debunked the metaphysical idea of the human as an exceptional being. While Aristotle saw humans as "political animals," by the 18th century, humans began to be understood as animals among others—yet with the potential to calculate their actions in advance in order to reshape their environment and improve the conditions of their species' existence.

At the same time, the first fundamental disagreement arose among progressive natural scientists. On the one hand, we owe to Jean-Baptiste Pierre Antoine de Monet Lamarck the idea of purposeful evolution, and on the other, to Charles Robert Darwin, the concept of blind selection in species evolution. Both thinkers saw natural history as a continuous process of becoming, where the social was no longer separate from the natural. For both, the evolution of organisms was a platform for progress and improvement.

However, Lamarck believed that adaptively advantageous traits are inherited in a directed manner under environmental pressure, allowing subsequent generations to cumulatively increase their survival potential, while unnecessary traits atrophy. Darwin, by contrast, argued that evolution occurs randomly through natural and sexual selection—weak individuals do not survive, while strong ones leave offspring, thus fixing beneficial changes in the organism.

This logic instantly opened the door to speculation about improving the human race.

Darwin's cousin, Sir Francis Galton—a typical Victorian amateur scientist active in nearly all branches of natural science from meteorology to psychology, acoustics to statistics—interpreted evolution, after reading his relative’s work, as a practical tool for selecting individuals based on traits useful for serving the empire, productive labor, and so on. As the founder of the science of "eugenics," Galton was particularly concerned with cultivating geniuses—like himself—through the pairing of individuals with strong hereditary talents in order to produce gifted sons. Of course, nothing of the sort was said about daughters, since the weaker sex, by definition, was biologically incapable of spiritual greatness. Historians of Western science consider Galton a precursor and, in part, a father of racial theory, misogynistic studies, psychometrics, technocratic utilitarianism, and totalitarian control.

From that moment, biology ceased to be merely a science and began to be considered—mainly by sociopaths—as a technology for managing the future. Since then, the attribution of morality or empathy to the domain of ethics has been questioned, and the idea that these are merely biologically determined reactions has gained credibility.

In this section, we will witness the development of a dilemma-based justification of the nature of social activism within the framework of biological determinism. We will try to understand how much is free choice here, and how much is dictated by the survival model.

Lorenz

Humans possess empathy toward those close to them, and hostility or distrust toward those perceived as distant. In times of danger, they cling to their own and, to put it mildly, repel those they do not consider their own (although today this distinction is not always obvious).

Nobel laureate, zoologist, and ethologist Konrad Zacharias Lorenz viewed aggression as a multifactorial instinctive behavior inherent to all animals, including humans, and considered it evolutionarily necessary for species survival, with adaptation to the environment seen as a kind of biological morality.

He believed that aggression accumulates and requires release, akin to hydraulic pressure. Accordingly, he considered the only safeguard against excessive aggression in human communities to be ethnic culture—exclusive traditions that channel the surplus energy into survival-promoting behavioral models such as territorial defense, charity aimed at group members, creativity, etc. Conversely, if cultural templates lose relevance, destructive energy is unleashed. Lorenz viewed traditional culture, with its stable behavioral repertoire and ritual limitations, as an ecosystem that harmonizes human animal instincts. Therefore, he considered any social innovations, technological progress, immigration, and similar mass structural changes to the existential landscape as at least disruptive.

According to Lorenz's proper scenario, if aggression is released in response to culturally acceptable external challenges, it does not take destructive forms but instead can serve as a stimulus—for example, for voluntary activities benefiting the community, thus preserving societal balance.

However, if the volitional response is directed at external challenges originating from foreign cultural backgrounds, what happens, according to Lorenz, is a "blank discharge of aggression," which ultimately leads to chaos and escalating violence.

This understanding of social mechanics is largely explained by Lorenz's background and worldview, typical of many from his class—his father was a successful Viennese doctor; his era—he was born at the start of the 20th century and died near its end; and his national allegiance—he was an Austrian citizen and more than a loyal subject of the Third Reich.

By his own admission, as a "German-thinking natural scientist," he was a convinced National Socialist even before formally joining the party and working in Nazi institutions. Lorenz participated in racial selection programs and promoted ideas about the dangers of mixing "biologically incompatible" human populations. However, in later years, when he was affectionately nicknamed "goose daddy" for his public love of waterfowl—the very animals on which he built his theory—this highly media-visible scholar repeatedly insisted that his Nazi past had been youthful folly, although forty is not all that youthful. 

Sapolsky

Neuroendocrinologist and primatologist Robert Morris Sapolsky is an extreme liberal and an absolute determinist, devoid of even a drop of Teutonic sentimentality. Lorenz would have likely commented on such a worldview in terms of racial incompatibility.

Compared to the instinct-driven will of Lorenz's human, Sapolsky argues: the human is a biochemical event. Free will does not exist in any form and cannot manifest at any level of being. Everything is determined by genetics, hormones, embryonic development, traumatic experience, and social context. Every thought we have, every emotion we feel, and all our desires are the result of a causal chain we cannot control.

The combination of extreme liberalism—which presumes at least some freedom of will—and extreme determinism—which denies even the possibility of such will—might seem paradoxical. But Sapolsky is not the least bit troubled by it.

There is no free will, but in its place exists conscious responsibility, even unconscious responsibility—for the inevitable consequences of automatic actions performed by a biological organism. If Sapolsky weren’t a known atheist, one could say his doctrine echoes something deeply Old Testament-like.

His activism is particularly notable in opposition to the modern legal system, which punishes and condemns for actions not committed consciously. While modern legal practice does recognize the concept of a "crime of passion," which mitigates guilt, Sapolsky considers this a deceitful half-measure. For him, all human behavior is one continuous state of affect. Thus, the legal system becomes a mechanism of unjustified vengeance by a frustrated public that still believes, especially in cases of gruesome crimes, that the criminal made a free choice.

Sapolsky has frequently testified in court as an expert in cases involving particularly brutal murders, convincingly arguing that the defendant simply had no chance not to commit the crime. Their genetics, childhood trauma, hormonal background, brain disorders, and so on directly led them to specific actions, and free will had no part in it.

So what should we do in a situation where we cannot find the guilty party or even understand the reasons for our actions?

Sapolsky’s answer is: inclusivity, empathy, social activism, individual and collective responsibility.

Abandon the false premise that we consciously choose one path over another.

Reject hypocritical condemnation, torture, and execution of those who have committed heinous crimes. We must neutralize the recurrence of their actions, which requires isolation and rehabilitation through neuroethical prevention.

Build a social environment that minimizes stress and aggression—not punishing, but trying to adapt individuals as much as possible.

 Implement a secular, humanistic ethic that does not recognize sin but does recognize pain.

 Revise the humanist matrix, significantly eroded by idealistic overlays, through the lens of science.

Thus, we have two polar views by biologists on social altruism:

One position holds that the basis of social activism is selfish, instinctive aggression. By making a voluntary decision to sacrifice something for the good of the community, the individual essentially affirms their right to be considered an integral member, thereby overcoming the sense of helplessness in the face of threats looming over individual group members. Thus, by helping others, our abstract volunteer objectively increases their own chances of survival.

The second position argues that altruistic action is caused by the "volunteer's" state of consciousness and is by no means a free choice—such a charitable disposition results from a sum of factors ranging from upbringing and growth conditions to hereditary illnesses and atmospheric pressure at the moment.

In this light, benevolence seems almost cartoonish—as if angels of virtue are bouncing on clouds of biochemical determinism, their wings sprouting from hormonal balances.

Accordingly, starting from the animal responses of Homo sapiens, next time we will look at volunteering as an action of this species from a philosophical perspective.